Account Takeover Fraud

One of the most significant risks in federal fraud cases is the application of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (Aggravated Identity Theft). This statute carries a mandatory two-year prison sentence that must run consecutively to any underlying offense, dramatically increasing potential exposure.

In account takeover cases, prosecutors often argue that the use of login credentials—such as usernames and passwords—constitutes identity theft. The defense focuses on narrowing the scope of the statute. The argument is that using credentials to access an account is not the same as stealing someone’s identity to create new accounts or assume their identity in a broader sense.

Recent case law, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Dubin v. United States, provides important limits. Courts have emphasized that the use of another person’s identifying information must be central to the fraud, not merely incidental. Where the identity is used as a minor component rather than the core of the scheme, the aggravated identity theft charge may not apply.

By challenging how the statute is interpreted and applied, the goal is to eliminate the mandatory sentence exposure, which can significantly change the case posture and create opportunities for reduced charges or alternative resolutions.

Because account takeover activity typically involves online systems, prosecutors often charge federal wire fraud, and add conspiracy counts to expand liability. Conspiracy allows the government to attribute the actions of an entire group to a single defendant, increasing both exposure and sentencing risk.

The defense strategy focuses on separating the client from the broader scheme. If the client’s role was limited—such as purchasing credentials without participating in the underlying breach—we argue they are not part of the original hacking conspiracy. Mere association or downstream use does not automatically establish agreement or shared intent.

Another critical issue is the loss calculation. Prosecutors may attempt to attribute the total potential value of all affected accounts to the defendant. We challenge this by using forensic analysis to tie responsibility to actual, provable losses, not speculative figures. Reducing the loss amount can significantly lower sentencing exposure and reshape the case.

If a client is accused of running a credential stuffing botnet, the evidence is often massive server logs.

We attack the attribution. We argue that the IP addresses linked to the attack were zombie computers infected by malware and controlled by a third party, not our client. We show that our client's computer was a proxy, not the source. We also challenge the jurisdictional venue. If the server was overseas and the victims were scattered globally, we argue that the local federal court lacks the proper venue to hear the case.

SIM swapping cases are aggressively pursued by federal authorities, particularly where cryptocurrency accounts are targeted. These prosecutions often rely heavily on insider testimony from telecom employees who were bribed, coerced, or otherwise involved in facilitating unauthorized SIM transfers.

A key defense strategy is to challenge the credibility and role of these insiders. Cross-examination may reveal that the telecom employee acted independently or as a primary actor, rather than under the direction of the accused. Shifting focus to the insider’s conduct can weaken the government’s narrative.

For individuals accused of receiving or benefiting from transferred funds, the defense centers on lack of knowledge and intent. The argument is that control of a wallet or account does not automatically establish criminal awareness. Where applicable, evidence is presented to show the client believed they were engaging in legitimate transactions, not participating in account takeover fraud.

Ultimately, these cases often turn on whether the government can prove knowing involvement, rather than mere association with the movement of funds.

Under Regulation E, consumers are generally protected from liability for unauthorized electronic funds transfers, provided they report the activity within the required timeframes. Financial institutions, however, often attempt to deny claims by arguing that the customer’s actions—such as sharing credentials—constitute negligence.

In litigation, the focus is on the definition of “unauthorized”. Even in phishing scenarios, the argument is that the customer did not truly authorize the transfer itself, but was deceived into enabling it. The distinction between consent to share information and authorization of the transaction is critical.

We also examine the bank’s internal conduct. This includes seeking evidence of fraud detection systems and risk flags associated with the transaction. If the institution identified the activity as suspicious but failed to act, that can support a claim that the bank did not meet its duty to protect the account.

By shifting the analysis to both the nature of the authorization and the bank’s response, the goal is to establish that liability should not rest solely on the consumer, particularly where the institution had the ability to prevent the loss.

Cryptocurrency exchanges are frequent targets of account takeover fraud, often due to weaker security controls and limited customer support compared to traditional financial institutions. These vulnerabilities can allow rapid unauthorized access and withdrawal of funds.

From a legal standpoint, claims may focus on Negligence and Breach of contract, particularly where security measures fall below reasonable industry standards. For example, allowing immediate password resets followed by large withdrawals without additional verification or delay mechanisms may be argued as commercially unreasonable.

Recovery efforts often involve tracing digital assets on the blockchain to identify movement patterns and potential endpoints. In urgent cases, courts may be asked to issue freezing or restraining orders to preserve assets before they are further transferred or obscured.

These cases combine technical analysis with legal strategy, aiming to establish responsibility and pursue recovery through all available remedies.