Antitrust Compliance Program Development Attorney Maps Cartel Risk

Similar prices or bids alone do not prove a Sherman Act § 1 agreement. The concern is an agreement with a rival on price, bids, customers, areas, output, or other market terms.

• Pricing: Record the internal inputs behind major price or discount changes.
• Bidding: Escalate unusual bid patterns, rival messages, or requests to stand down.
• State law: Screen conduct that may restrain competition in the state under GBL § 340.
• Records: Preserve existing evidence when possible cartel conduct is found.

See Price Fixing for the broader cartel framework.

Trade shows, industry groups, benchmarks, and rival calls may serve valid business purposes. Risk rises when a discussion shifts toward how the parties will compete.

• Define subjects employees should not discuss with rivals.
• Use agendas and attendance records for planned rival meetings.
• Require prompt review if price, bid, customer, area, or output coordination is raised.
• Use lawful, named sources for rival intelligence and market research.

Federal law generally reviews vertical price and territory restraints under the rule of reason. Naked market allocation among rivals is a per se Sherman Act § 1 violation. State law can add separate limits.

See Commercial Distribution Law for broader channel issues.

Low prices, loyalty discounts, and refusals to deal are not unlawful on that basis alone. Section 2 review focuses on monopoly power and exclusionary conduct used to acquire or maintain it.

• Review below-cost plans that depend on later recoupment.
• Examine loyalty terms that may foreclose rivals from key buyers.
• Escalate refusals to deal when they may form part of an exclusionary plan.
• Document valid business reasons when the decision is made.

The 2000 federal competitor-collaboration guidelines remain withdrawn, so old safety-zone assumptions should not drive current review. Focus on the data shared, why it is needed, and who receives it.

• Limit current price, customer, output, wage, and strategy data to what the project needs.
• Use aggregation or limited access when it fits the business purpose.
• Set meeting rules for trade groups, standards work, and recurring rival contacts.
• Review license terms when standards work affects technology or IP access.

See Joint Venture and Strategic Alliance for broader deal issues.

Deal parties should keep making their own market decisions before closing. Integration planning should not become joint control over current prices, customers, bids, output, or similar choices.

• Use need-based access for sensitive deal data.
• Consider clean-team controls when sensitive data must be reviewed.
• Keep current market decisions separate until control lawfully shifts.
• Track divestiture, firewall, monitor, or attestation duties when an order imposes them.

Preserve existing material rather than rebuilding events after the fact. Identify who was involved and separate independent decisions from evidence of an agreement.

• Preserve relevant email, chat, bid, price, and meeting records.
• Map the people, business units, and outside parties tied to the issue.
• Separate fact review from documents describing future fixes.
• Consider privilege and review structure before broad internal sharing.

DOJ leniency applies to qualifying criminal cartel conduct under specific policy terms. It is not general cooperation credit, and program changes do not determine the agency result.

• Assess leniency promptly when price fixing, bid rigging, or market allocation may be involved.
• Review eligibility, timing, and cooperation duties before a self-reporting decision.
• Revise approvals, training, monitoring, and reporting around the conduct found.
• Assign owners and testing steps so new controls work beyond the written policy.

See Competition Compliance for broader response planning.