Obstruction of Official Duties | Analysis of a Supreme Court Decision Holding That Pushing a Police Officer Without Justifiable Reason Constitutes Obstruction of Official Duties

The circumstances under which defendant A was brought to trial for obstruction of official duties are as follows.

Late one night, a report was received at a police substation. The person who made the report was a taxi driver.

The taxi driver complained that a passenger had boarded the taxi as he pleased and showed no intention of getting out.

In response, the police immediately went to the scene and assessed the situation.

At the scene, A, who was heavily intoxicated, and the taxi driver were in a dispute.

Pointing at the taxi driver, A claimed that, although the vehicle had not been reserved, the taxi driver had refused to provide a ride.

However, A's claim differed from the facts; the taxi had in fact already been reserved.

Accordingly, the police officers explained the situation to A and then informed him of how to file a complaint regarding a refusal to provide a ride.

However, A's words and conduct grew rougher. He eventually went so far as to thrust his body toward an officer standing at the roadside while shouting.

In response to such conduct, a fellow officer pushed A to restrain him. Becoming even more agitated, A hurled profanities and pushed the fellow officer's body several times.

Ultimately, A was brought to trial for obstruction of official duties.

The conclusions reached by the first- and second-instance courts on the obstruction of official duties were the same.

They acquitted A, finding him ‘not guilty.’

The first-instance court first found that the responding officers' failure to accept the report of the refusal to provide a ride was unlawful.

The first-instance court's determination was that, because A had felt the officers' conduct was improper and had resisted it, his conduct constituted a justifiable act.

The appellate court, for its part, first found that the officers' conduct involved no illegality.

It held that it could not be regarded as unreasonable for the officers to have judged that A, who was approaching the female officer while shouting at the time, might soon resort to physical force.

It noted, however, that from A's perspective, he had merely protested loudly and had no intention of using physical force, and that when another officer pushed him, there was an aspect in which he misunderstood this as an abuse of police authority and resisted it.

It therefore added that, pursuant to Article 16 of the Criminal Act, A should be regarded as bearing no liability.

Article 16 of the Criminal Act provides that ‘conduct in which a person mistakenly believes that his act does not constitute a crime under statute shall not be punishable, only where there is a justifiable reason for such mistake.’

The first- and second-instance courts determined that there was a ‘justifiable reason’ for A to have engaged in such conduct and held that it did not constitute a crime.

The Supreme Court, which reviewed the obstruction of official duties anew, reached a different determination.

It found that A's conduct involved no justifiable reason.

The Supreme Court first explained that, at the time, A continued to protest in a heavily intoxicated state despite the officers' guidance, and did not stop his dangerous conduct, including pushing a female officer of smaller build than himself toward the road.

It emphasized that, under these circumstances, the fellow officer's act of pushing A away and separating him constituted lawful official conduct relating to the ‘prevention and suppression of crime’ provided for in the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers.

The Supreme Court also rejected the ‘grounds for excluding illegality’ mentioned by the first- and second-instance courts.

It held that A's conduct was not unrelated to the fact that A was intoxicated at the time and that, in that state, he continued to make baseless complaints and worked himself into an agitated state.

It added that, had A not himself provided the occasion for the mistake, or had he made even the slightest effort to avoid the mistake, this incident would not have occurred.

However, the Supreme Court held that the lower court had concluded that a justifiable reason existed without specifically identifying what circumstances would support a finding that there was a justifiable reason for A's mistake, and it reversed the judgment and ordered a retrial.

We have introduced a case in which a defendant indicted for obstruction of official duties was acquitted in the lower courts but received a Supreme Court judgment reversing and remanding the case on grounds pointing toward a conviction.

There are not a few cases in which a person is punished for obstruction of official duties after getting into a dispute with police officers who have responded to a report, or with administrative public officials handling civil-complaint matters.

Where there is a justifiable reason for interfering with official duties, or a reasonable ground for not recognizing that one's interfering conduct is unlawful, a person may not be punished pursuant to Article 16 of the Criminal Act.

That said, during the investigation and trial, one must present objective and clear evidence as to the ‘justifiable and reasonable grounds.’

For this reason, if you are facing a related charge, it is advisable to promptly obtain the assistance of an attorney experienced in criminal matters and develop a strategy.

Daeryun Law Firm LLP operates a ‘Criminal Group’ staffed by a number of attorneys who have worked across various fields.

Consultations are available, so if you have any related inquiries, you are welcome to request a 🔗consultation with Daeryun at any time.